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IT IS TIME FOR WASHINGTON STATE TO TAKE A STAND
AGAINST HOLMES’S BAD MAN: THE VALUE OF PUNITIVE




In Washington State, tortfeasors get a break when they commit intentional torts.
Instead of receiving more punishment for their planned bad act, intentional
tortfeasors are punished as if they committed a mere accident. The trend does not
stop in Washington State—nationwide, punitive damage legislation inadequately
deters intentional wrongdoers through caps and outright bans on punitive dam-
ages. Despite Washington State’s one hundred and twenty-five year ban on
punitive damages, it is in a unique and powerful position to change the way courts
across the country deal with intentional tortfeasors. Since Washington has never
had a compehrensive punitive damages framework, and has largely avoided the
sway of the nationwide tort reform movement, it is a blank slate for demonstrating
how punitive damages should be used to deter intentional wrongdoing in a fair
and appropriate way. While law and economics theorists have debated how to reach
complete deterrence, this Note’s argument takes reality into consideration in the
form of binding Supreme Court precedent on punitive damages to provide a puni-
tive damages framework that results in more deterrence than current punitive
damages provide, and still passes constitutional scrutiny. This Note argues for a
punitive damages framework based on graduated levels of culpability and corre-
lated compensatory to punitive damage-award ratios to allow for as much
deterrence of intentional wrongdoing as possible, while conforming to Supreme
Court precedent.
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INTRODUCTION
Intentionally harming someone is wrong and warrants punish-
ment to deter future intentional wrongdoing. Punitive damages
serve this role.1 Judge Richard Posner underlined the utility of pu-
nitive damages in the paradigmatic case, Mathias v. Accor Economy
Lodging, where he upheld a punitive damages award that was over
thirty-seven times the compensatory damages award to punish the
Defendant, Motel 6, for intentionally subjecting its customers to
bed bugs. Motel 6 decided it was more “economical” to lie to their
customers than take care of their bed bugs.2 The lawsuit’s punitive
damage award straightened out Motel 6’s cost-benefit evaluation so
it was no longer economically efficient to lie to its guests about bed
bugs.
Despite the upsides of punitive damages, they are under siege
from an entrenched tort reform movement, which argues that pu-
nitive damages are arbitrary and harmful to innovation.3 As anti-
1. Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83, 90
(2007).
2. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2004).
3. See Jill McKee Pohlman, Comment, Punitive Damages in the American Civil Justice Sys-
tem: Jackpot or Justice?, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 613, 654 (1996) (advocating for punitive damage
reform and noting that “[m]any have . . . referred to these [punitive damage] awards as
‘jackpots’ because they are awarded in large amounts without any predictability and often
without reason.”).
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punitive damage legislation shows, these arguments have been ac-
cepted by a large number of legislators and their voters.4 The result
has been a scaling back of the effectiveness of punitive damages in
the states that still have punitive damages, and the outright elimina-
tion of punitive damages in others.5 Critics of tort reform argue that
intentional tortfeasors and big business enjoy a subsidy from the
American people to commit intentional torts since they are pun-
ished as if their purposeful wrongdoing was simple negligence.
Washington State has never had punitive damages, except in spe-
cific and limited circumstances.6 Its ban on punitive damages is not
a result of its legislation or Constitution, but the holding of three
Washington Supreme Court Justices in 1891.7 This means Washing-
ton is not tied to anti-punitive damages legislation or an
entrenched political stance on punitive damages since the ban
stems from common law created in the 1800s, which can be over-
ruled by legislation.  All of this places Washington in a position to
set the standard for how punitive damages should be used in the
United States. If Washington can demonstrate the benefits of an
effective punitive damages framework, it may persuade other states
to put down their tort reform armor and pick up a sword to deter
intentional wrongs.
This Note’s proposed reform is a punitive damages framework
that would be implemented by Washington’s legislature. The legis-
lative framework would provide substantially more deterrence than
Washington, or any state, currently has while passing the Supreme
Court’s scrutiny on punitive damages. The framework focuses on
graduated culpability levels tied to specific punitive damage-award
ratios to obtain as much deterrence as possible while complying
with the Supreme Court’s precedent on punitive damages.
This reform provides a new perspective on punitive damages that
focuses on adapting law and economics efficiency arguments to the
Supreme Court’s muddled punitive damages doctrine. In doing so,
it recommends a clear punitive damages platform that can easily be
adopted by other states. Punitive damages scholarship focuses al-
most exclusively on arguments about why punitive damages are
arbitrary,8 or, taking a different view, how punitive damages can be
4. See Punitive Damages Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/issues/
punitive-damages-reform (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
5. Id.
6. Infra Part I.C.
7. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1074–75 (Wash. 1891) (holding
punitive damages are against state interest).
8. Before Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) and Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) were decided, Professors Chanenson and Gotanda argued the
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most efficient, without regard to Supreme Court precedent and
other practical constraints to implementation.9 This Note’s reform
takes both sides of the scholarly debate into consideration, as well
as existing precedent. Furthermore, there is no legal scholarship
advocating for a specific punitive damages framework in Washing-
ton State. This is likely due to the fact that only two years after
becoming a state, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that puni-
tive damages are prohibited.10 The chance to implement a punitive
damages framework in Washington that could serve as a model for
other states is an important opportunity to better protect individu-
als from intentional wrongdoing that should not be overlooked any
longer. This Note provides a comprehensive solution to Washing-
ton’s lack of punitive damages, and offers a model for other states
looking to better deter intentional wrongdoing by focusing on the
deterrent effect of punitive damages.
Part I explains the purpose of punitive damages, their history in
American political culture, and their current status in the Supreme
Court and Washington State. It examines the most persuasive law
and economics theories behind punitive damages, binding prece-
dent from the United States Supreme Court, and the few
exceptions where punitive damages are available in Washington.
This review shows that the Supreme Court’s punitive damages pre-
cedent is anything but clear.
Part II shows the benefits a punitive damage framework can offer
Washington. This part centers on the Washington Supreme Court’s
focus in 1891 on the public good,11 and discusses how punitive
damages actually serve the public good. This discussion tracks basic
law and economics theory.
Part III shows why this Note’s proposed reform of implementing
a graduated culpability framework for punitive damages is consis-
tent with both the public interest of Washington and Supreme
Court precedent. It also offers options for how to split punitive
damages awards. This Part concludes with recommendations on
presumptive constitutional limit on punitive damages should be set by looking to comparable
civil or criminal legislative fines in order to give “fair notice” to defendants and to avoid
arbitrary awards. Steven L. Chanenson & John Y. Gotanda, The Foggy Road for Evaluating Puni-
tive Damages: Lifting the Haze from the BMW/State Farm Guideposts, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
441, 492 (2004).
9. Steve P. Calandrillo, Penalizing Punitive Damages: Why the Supreme Court Needs A Lesson
in Law and Economics, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 774 (2010) (claiming that “[from]
a law and economics lens . . . there is no justifiable basis for tort law’s requirement of morally
reprehensible or intentional conduct before punitive damages may be awarded.”)
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. Spokane Truck & Dray Co., 25 P. at 1074–75.
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how to implement the framework; specifically, by using the legisla-
ture instead of trying to change Washington Supreme Court
precedent through litigation.
This Note ends by emphasizing the importance of overhauling
punitive damages in every state, and why this reform is an effective
model for other states to use. Washington has a unique opportunity
to make intentional tortfeasors take responsibility for their inten-
tional bad acts. By utilizing the outer limits of Supreme Court
precedent, Washington State can transform our punitive damages
back to their central purpose—deterrence.
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: DETER AND PUNISH TO EVEN THE SCALES
Punitive damage awards are one of the biggest areas of conten-
tion in the tort reform debate. They are defined as monetary
awards in excess of the economic and noneconomic damages that
make an injured party whole, and their purpose is typically to deter
future conduct by the defendant and similar parties.12 Other schol-
ars and commentators characterize punitive damages as a
punishment.13 In the wake of the tort reform movement,14 punitive
damages have often received the brunt of political and social criti-
cism.15 This criticism extends back to the 1970s when tort reform
advocates began their public relations campaign to restrict personal
injury suits and limit the amount of recovery available based on the
type of lawsuit, regardless of the amount of harm, arguing that the
civil justice system was broken and served undeserving personal in-
jury victims and attorneys.16
Since the 1970s, tort reform advocates have continuously ob-
jected to personal injury suits. They have argued that personal
12. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347,
363–64 (2003).
13. See id.
14. The tort reform movement seeks to reduce the volume of victims that bring tort
lawsuits and to limit the amount of recovery possible. It does not represent any reform to tort
law, but only those that constrain and limit remedies in our civil justice system.
15. Michael L. Rustad, Access to Justice: Can Business Co-exist with the Civil Justice System?:
The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (2005) (“True-
sounding anecdotes do not make claims about punitive damages true. ‘Few arguments are as
powerful as a populist-sounding cause backed by the corporate wallet.’”) (quoting Marie
Cocco, Bush Tortures: Facts on ‘Trial Lawyers,’ NEWSDAY, July 13, 2004, at A39); Denise E.
Antolini, Punitive Damages in Rhetoric and Reality: An Integrated Empirical Analysis of Punitive
Damage Judgments in Hawaii, 1985-2001, 20 J.L. & POL. 143, 145 (2004) (punitive damages
have served as the “notorious poster children of the national tort reform movement”).
16. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact That It Has Had Is Between People’s
Ears:” Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 454 (2000).
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injury suits are more common than ever, frivolous lawsuits are the
norm, damages are too high, corporate defendants cannot get a
fair trial, and aggressive plaintiffs’ personal injury lawyers make us
all pay higher costs—through increased insurance costs17 and chil-
led innovation—because of their greed in seeking punitive
damages.18 Further, tort reform proponents argue that punitive
damages punish the wrong people (shareholders and consumers
versus corporate decision makers), encourage more litigation, and
create unpredictability.19
In response, tort reform opponents argue that there is no “liabil-
ity crisis” by pointing to empirical studies,20 and contend that tort
law serves an important public service of discouraging harmful be-
havior. They contend the tort reform movement is funded by big
business interests that are damaging to the public good, and that
the frivolous lawsuits pandemic is a myth.21 Proponents of punitive
damages see them as crucial to deterring harmful corporate and
individual behavior by punishing the specific offender and deter-
ring other possible offenders in the future.22
Punitive damages are, in theory, a specific way to control inten-
tional behavior tortfeasors deem economically sound, even though
they know it runs a risk of harming others.23 Punitive damages can
be used to make Ken change his behavior in the following example:
Ken slaps Stan. The fine for slapping Stan is $19 dollars. Ken is
happy to pay this fine, and continue slapping Stan (and anyone else
his hands can reach). But, if punitive damages can be awarded, Ken
will have to take this into account, and Ken will be influenced to
curb his behavior so he avoids situations where he might be
17. But see Jessica Mantel, Spending Medicare’s Dollars Wisely: Taking Aim at Hospitals’ Cul-
tures of Overtreatment, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 121, 133 (2015) (arguing that prices are raised
not only because of the fear of medical malpractice suits, but also because of Medicare’s own
pricing structure because “physicians [are paid] for each unit of service provided, fee-for-
service rewards doing more.”).
18. Daniels & Martin, supra note 16, at 453–55; About ATRA, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N,
http://www.atra.org/about (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
19. W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 381, 381–85
(1998).
20. See Neil Vidmar, Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform: Avoidance, Error, and Over-
reaching in Sunstein et al.’s Punitive Damages, 53 EMORY L.J. 1359, 1369-70 (2004) (providing  a
list of empirical studies showing that punitive damages are rare, and that the median punitive
damage award in 1996 was, contrary to tort reform advocates’ belief, a modest $50,000.00)
21. Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 964
(2007).
22. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 559 (2016); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 242 (9th ed. 2014) (arguing that adding a “dollop of punitive damages” will make
tort law a real deterrent).
23. POSNER, supra note 22, at 241.
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tempted to slap Stan, if the punitive damages award is set high
enough.
Punitive damages are also used to deter behavior that is espe-
cially egregious.24 Either way, the purpose of punitive damages is to
protect the public from serious wrongs by corporations, govern-
ments, and individuals. A great example of this is the previously
mentioned Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging,25 where Judge Posner
upheld a punitive damages award aimed to take the profit of the
defendant’s intentional wrongdoing away from it. The case re-
volved around Motel 6’s decision to rent out rooms that they knew
were infested with bed bugs to hotel guests, and not tell customers
of the bed bug infestation. If asked about bed bugs, its policy was to
say they were “ticks” because this would frighten customers less.26
Despite widespread media coverage of huge punitive damages
awards—e.g., Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, also known as the
McDonald’s hot coffee lawsuit—they are rare.27 Under common
law, in order to face a punitive damages award, a defendant must be
sued in a state that allows punitive damages, and their actions must
be found to be more egregious than necessary for a normal negli-
gence suit.28 While punitive damage awards are uncommon,
proponents of punitive damages say they are necessary to curb the
corporate focus on profit over safety.29
Part I.A addresses the most convincing arguments for punitive
damages. By covering these arguments, which are mainly based on
the law and economics perspective on punitive damages, it is easier
to see the problems in Part I.B, which traces the Supreme Court’s
confusing trail map of punitive damages decisions and tries to make
sense of it. Part I.C covers Washington State’s presumptive ban on
24. Id. at 244.
25. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding
a punitive damages award 37.2 times the compensatory award).
26. Id. at 675.
27. Theodore Eisenberg, Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind the Headline-Grabbing
Awards in Exxon-Valdez and Engle, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2001); Michael L.
Rustad, The Incidence, Scope, and Purpose of Punitive Damages: Unraveling Punitive Damages: Cur-
rent Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15, 69 (1998) (showing that, empirically, up to
1998, there “is no nationwide punitive damages crisis. The research shows that punitive dam-
ages cluster in business tort and intentional tort cases, not personal injury. The increase in
punitive damages is largely confined to a few jurisdiction.”).
28. The actual standard varies by state, but it is typically a “clear and convincing” stan-
dard of the defendant’s culpable mental state.
29. Rustad, supra note 27, at 47 (“If potential wrongdoers know that their total exposure
is limited to a fixed amount, there is only a limited deterrent effect. Removing wealth from
the punitive damages equation also eliminates effective punishment.”); see Mathias, 347 F.3d
at 674 (explaining that, in the lower court proceedings, the jurors agreed with the plaintiffs’
argument that the defendant should be liable for punitive damages due to their “willful and
wanton conduct”).
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punitive damages, the 1891 lawsuit that took punitive damages out
of Washington juries’ hands, and the few statutory exceptions
where the state allows punitive damages.
A. The Law and Economics Take on Punitive Damages:
Optimal Deterrence
Law and economics provides a useful perspective on punitive
damages. Several law and economics theorists have explained why
punitive damage awards can be a positive asset to public welfare.
These reasons include effectively deterring behavior society deems
dangerous,30 allowing tortfeasors to continue to positively contrib-
ute to society,31 forcing parties to the market,32 and protecting
society from predatory behavior.33 The law and economics perspec-
tive on punitive damages hinges on deterrence and punishment,
but is balanced by the discipline’s concern of “avoid[ing] overcom-
pensation as [well as] undercompensation.”34
Typically, law and economics theorists say that optimal deter-
rence is reached by awarding a punitive damage judgment that
takes into account the degree of discoverability of the tortfeasor’s
act.35 The law and economics professor will take the probability of
detection and multiply it by the profit the tortfeasor makes from
the act.36 This understanding gives support to Judge Posner’s deci-
sion in Mathias, because the defendant deliberately tried to conceal
its tortious acts. Judge Posner supports this assertion in his compre-
hensive and definitive book on the doctrine, “Economic Analysis of
Law,” explaining that “punitive damages punish a tortfeasor who
sneaks by detection in the past, and therefore reach[es] the correct
level of deterrence.”37 This inquiry relies on deterrence, not punish-
ment, for justification.
The law and economics perspective on criminal punishment un-
derlines the benefits of punitive damages. Economists believe fines
30. Sharkey, supra note 12, at 418.
31. POSNER, supra note 22, at 262 (explaining the “social costs of imprisonment greatly
exceed the costs of collecting fines from solvent defendants”).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 223.
35. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARV. L. REV. 869, 887–88 (1998).
36. POSNER, supra note 22, at 242 (“If a tort is concealed (as in a hit-and-run accident),
punitive damages or a criminal penalty must be added to the defendant’s profit or the vic-
tim’s loss to provide adequate deterrence.”).
37. Id.
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are a better criminal punishment than incarceration because fines
are cheaper to implement, allow for the right amount of punish-
ment and deterrence, and allow the individual to continue working
and contributing to society.38 Insolvency issues explain why fines are
not used more in our criminal justice system.39
B. The Supreme Court Does Punitive Damages, Timidly
Over the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has heard sev-
eral important punitive damage cases. Through these cases, the
Supreme Court has developed a set of murky boundaries within
which punitive damage awards are allowed under the Constitution.
Understanding these constitutional boundaries sheds light on what
is possible for any potential punitive damage scheme in Washing-
ton. Through these punitive damages cases, the Supreme Court
underscores its focus on ensuring punitive damage awards corre-
spond to the intentionally tortious act that harmed the victim, and
are a predictable penalty.
1. The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
Does Not Apply to Civil Cases
In Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal,40 the Supreme Court
held that neither the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment nor federal common law provided a basis for disturbing the
jury’s punitive damages award in a civil case. Browning-Ferris in-
volved an antitrust suit, where the plaintiff, Kelco Disposal, brought
forth and won an antitrust and interference with contractual rela-
tions lawsuit in Vermont. The trial court awarded, and the Supreme
Court eventually upheld, $51,146 in compensatory damages and $6
million in punitive damages for interfering with Kelco’s contractual
relations.41 This holding is in full force today.
38. Id. at 261.
39. See infra Part I.C.2. (explaining how fines struggle to deter intentional criminal con-
duct for some criminals).
40. 492 U.S. 257, 280 (1989).
41. Id. at 261–62.
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2. A Framework for Determining Excessiveness Under the
Fourteenth Amendment for Due Process
In 1991, the Supreme Court refused in Pacific Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company v. Haslip to “draw a mathematical bright line between
the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unaccept-
able [punitive damage awards] that would fit every case,” and opted
for a test of “general concerns of reasonableness.”42 This balancing
test consisted of several factors to determine if the punitive award is
reasonably related to the “goals of punishment and deterrence.”43
The factors used in considering whether the punitive damage
award is excessive or inadequate are:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the pu-
nitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the
defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that actually has oc-
curred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant’s aware-
ness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of
similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the defendant of
the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that
profit and of having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the
“financial position” of the defendant; (e) all the costs of litiga-
tion; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant
for its conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the
existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the
same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.44
After considering these factors, the Supreme Court decided in
this case, where the plaintiffs’ insurer misappropriated premiums,
causing the plaintiffs’ health insurance policies to lapse without
them knowing, that a punitive damages award of more than four
times the compensatory award was not excessive.45
42. 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
43. Id. at 21 (quoting Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 530 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala. 1989)).
44. Id. at 21–22.
45. Id. at 6–7, 22.
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3. Using a General Concern of Reasonableness to Determine if
the Punitive Award is So Grossly Excessive as to Violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Two years later, the Supreme Court returned to punitive dam-
ages.  In TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., the Court focused on
the “general concerns of reasonableness” illustrated in Haslip to de-
cide whether a punitive damages award for a common-law slander
of title suit against a large and wealthy company, TXO, engaged in
a knowing baseless quitclaim deed to leverage more royalties from
Alliance Resources Corporation—just like it had done to other
small businesses across the country—violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 Justice Stevens announced
the decision of the Court, which did not have a majority opinion,
that the judgment against TXO, which included $19,000 in actual
damages and $10 million in punitive damages for slander of title,
was not excessive under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.47 The punitive damages were 526 times the compensatory
damages, which passed the “general concerns of reasonableness”
standard under the Fourteenth Amendment.48
4. Judicial Review is an Important Safeguard to Ensure Punitive
Damage Awards are Constitutional
The Court next heard an Oregon negligence action where the
defendant, Honda, created and sold three-wheel all-terrain vehicles
(ATVs), one of which overturned while plaintiff Karl Oberg was
driving it. The jury agreed with Oberg’s estate that Honda should
have known that its ATV had an “inherently and unreasonably dan-
gerous design.”49 Honda appealed on the grounds that the punitive
damage award was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution because Oregon’s recent statute, OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.9325(3),50 violated due process.51 The statute says that
judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury
is only permitted if a court can affirmatively say there is no evidence
to support the verdict. The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the trial
46. 509 U.S. 443, 443 (1993).
47. Id. at 462.
48. Id. at 473 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
49. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994).
50. Id. at 427, 440.
51. Id. at 415.
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court’s decision, but the Supreme Court of the United States re-
versed, holding that the functional denial of the review of punitive
damages violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because “[p]unitive damages pose an acute danger of
arbitrary deprivation of property” since juries have wide discretion
in awarding damages and because Oregon “removed that safeguard
[judicial review of punitive damages] without providing any substi-
tute procedure and without any indication that the danger of
arbitrary awards has in any way subsided over time.”52
5. 500-to-1 Punitive to Compensatory Damage Award is Not
Constitutional if Conduct is Not Particularly
Reprehensible, and There is Only Minor
Economic Damage
In BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, the Supreme Court held that a $2 mil-
lion award of punitive damages was “grossly excessive” under the
Fourteenth Amendment when the compensatory damages were
only $4,000.53  In the case, Dr. Gore sued BMW for failing to dis-
close that his new BMW had been repainted after it was damaged by
acid rain during its delivery from Germany. At trial, BMW admitted
to having a nationwide policy of not informing its customers of de-
livery damage when the costs “did not exceed three percent . . . of
the car’s suggested retail price.”54 Justice Stevens’ majority opinion
looked at “three guideposts” to determine whether the defendant,
BMW, had received adequate notice of the possible sanctions it
could face.55 These guideposts were: (1) the degree of reprehensi-
bility of the nondisclosure; (2) the disparity between the harm or
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and their punitive damages
award; and (3) the difference between this remedy and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.56
52. Id. at 432.
53. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996).
54. Id. at 559.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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6. General Guideline: Few Punitive Damage Awards Exceeding a
Single-Digit Ratio with Compensatory Damages Will
Satisfy Due Process
The Court in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell gave more
explicit guidance on navigating the punitive to actual damages ra-
tio. In this case, plaintiffs brought a bad faith insurance claim
against State Farm, and used evidence of State Farm’s national
scheme—which involved fraudulently capping claimant payouts to
meet its own predetermined corporate financial goal—to obtain a
$1 million compensatory damage award and a $145 million punitive
damages award. Justice Kennedy, writing for a six-justice majority,
declared that a $145 million punitive damage award for only $1 mil-
lion in compensatory damages was grossly excessive.57 The Court
noted that, in practice, “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant de-
gree, will satisfy due process.”58 The Court then reviewed the Utah
Supreme Court’s application of the three Gore factors—(1) repre-
hensibility, (2) ratio of actual damages to punitive damages, and
(3) comparable civil remedies—and found that this was not one of
the rare circumstances where a punitive to compensatory damages
ratio greater than a single-digit ratio would satisfy due process.59
The Court’s reasoning shows its focus on predictability and dis-
taste for punishment for its own sake in civil suits. Under the first
Gore guidepost, the reprehensibility analysis, the Supreme Court
noted that the reprehensibility of a defendant should be deter-
mined by looking at five factors: whether (1) the harm was physical
or economic; (2) the tortious conduct showed an indifference to or
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; (3) the target of
the conduct had financial vulnerability; (4) the conduct involved
repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and (5) the harm was
the result of an intentional act or an accident.60 The Utah Supreme
Court instead used this case as a “platform to expose, and punish,
the perceived deficiencies of State Farm’s operations throughout
the country.”61 In contrast, the United States Supreme Court, refer-
ring to the plaintiffs’ use of State Farm’s conduct in other states
where it was legal, held “[l]awful out-of-state conduct may be proba-
tive when it demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of the
57. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).
58. Id. at 425.
59. Id. at 429.
60. Id. at 419.
61. Id. at 420.
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defendant’s action in the State where it is tortious, but that conduct
must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff.”62
The Court then went on to the second Gore guidepost, the ratio
of actual damages to punitive damages, and held that, while “there
are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages award may not
surpass,” “[s]ingle digit multipliers are more likely to comport with
due process.”63 The Court held the adverse effect on Utah’s popula-
tion by State Farm’s national policies, which included failing to
report a $100 million punitive damage award in Texas, was minimal
and had little bearing on this case because the plaintiff was unable
to direct the Court to evidence demonstrating actual harm to the
people of Utah.64 The Court further held that, while the wealth of a
defendant can be an appropriate and lawful factor to consider,65
“this factor cannot make up for the failure of other factors, such as
‘reprehensibility’ . . . .” The Court also limited the scope of the
third factor, similar civil penalties analysis, by holding it is inappro-
priate to compare irrelevant and dissimilar out-of-state conduct.66
7. Punitive Damage Awards Can Only be Based Off Harm
Suffered by Parties to the Case
In Philip Morris USA v. Williams the Supreme Court decided a
complex tobacco case.67 Jesse Williams’ estate, and his widow, sued
Phillip Morris for leading Jesse to believe that cigarettes were not
bad for him, causing him to become addicted and die from smok-
ing-related lung cancer.68 Williams’ attorney told the jury to
“[t]hink about how many other Jesse Williams in the last 40 years in
the State of Oregon there have been. . . . [C]igarettes . . . are going
to kill ten [of every hundred].”69 The Court held that punitive dam-
ages based on a jury’s desire to punish a defendant for harming
others not party to the case is a taking of property from the defen-
dant without due process and remanded Williams’ suit.70
62. Id. at 422.
63. Id. at 425.
64. Id. at 427.
65. Id. at 428.
66. Id. at 427.
67. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
68. Id. at 349–50.
69. Id. at 350.
70. Id. at 357.
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8. 1-to-1 Compensatory to Punitive Damages Ratio is a Fair
Upper Limit for Maritime Cases
In the latest installment of the Supreme Court’s take on punitive
damages, the Court tackled the maritime case of the Exxon
Valdez.71 While this case does not deal with Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process, and instead focuses on the specifics of federal
maritime common law,72 it sheds light on the Court’s more recent
attention on predictability in punitive damages. The Exxon Valdez,
a supertanker grounded under the watch of intoxicated captain Jo-
seph Hazelwood, spilled millions of gallons of crude oil into the
Prince William Sound.73 The compensatory damages were $507.5
million, and the trial court awarded $5 billion in punitive damages,
which was reduced to $2.5 billion by the Ninth Circuit, and to
$507.5 million by the Supreme Court.74 In declining to uphold the
original punitive damages award, Justice Souter held that a ratio of
1:1 of compensatory to punitive damages is the maximum amount
of damages that can be awarded for an unintentional tort.75 Justice
Souter went to great lengths to emphasize that this case did not
deal with an intentional tort, but an unintentional and reckless
act.76 Justice Souter further discussed the importance of predictabil-
ity for even intentional tortfeasors by noting, “[a] penalty should be
reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even Holmes’s ‘bad
man’ can look ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are
in choosing one course of action or another.”77
Drawing from these cases, it is unclear how robust the Supreme
Court’s presumption against punitive damage awards in excess of a
single digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages is, or
how predictable a punitive damage award must be. Yet it appears
that the Court is concerned with making sure the punitive damage
award is not based off of a jury’s dislike of the defendant, but rather
on their intentional and reprehensible harm to a specific plaintiff.
Further, the Court is preoccupied with making sure punitive dam-
age amounts are predictable by intentional tortfeasors. With the
Supreme Court’s regular attendance to punitive damages, it is likely
71. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
72. Id. at 475.
73. Id. at 476.
74. Id. at 481, 514.
75. Id. at 513.
76. Id. at 493.
77. Id. at 502.
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that the court will hear another case on punitive damages soon.78 A
statute or judicial ruling on punitive damages from Washington
State could go a long way in serving as a model of effective use of
punitive damages for the entire country in light of the Court’s per-
plexing precedent.
C. The Punitive Scene in Washington: Largely Vacant
Washington is one of a minority of states that generally do not
award punitive damages. Washington prevents courts from award-
ing punitive damages unless the action falls under (1) one of the
few statutes specifically allowing for punitive damages,79 (2) the ac-
tion is based in federal maritime law,80 or (3) there is a conflict of
law which allows Washington to apply the laws of another state that
allows punitive damages.81 Excepting these narrow situations, Wash-
ington has barred punitive damage awards since 1891, two years
after it became a state, when the Washington Supreme Court held
in Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer,
Surely the public can have no interest in exacting the pound
of flesh . . . . [P]unitive damages cannot be allowed on the
theory that it is for the benefit of society at large, but must
logically be allowed on the theory that they are for the sole
benefit of the plaintiff, who has already been fully compen-
sated; a theory which is repugnant to every sense of justice.82
Washington’s ban on punitive damages is interesting because it
took place in a time completely removed from the tort reform focus
of the last couple of decades. Yet even with Washington’s ability to
dodge most of the popular tort reforms in the United States, it is
hard to believe that the media and public’s focus on tort reform
does not affect the continued ban on punitive damages in Washing-
ton.83 Washington is a good candidate for allowing punitive
78. David S. Kemp, The Constitution and Punitive Damages: A Ten-Year Anniversary Discus-
sion of State Farm v. Campbell, VERDICT (Apr. 8, 2013), https://verdict.justia.com/2013/04/
08/the-constitution-and-punitive-damages.
79. Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 635 P.2d 441, 443 (Wash. 1981) (“Under the law of
this state [Washington], punitive damages are not allowed unless expressly authorized by the
legislature.”).
80. Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 272 P.3d 827, 831 (Wash. 2012).
81. See Singh v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 210 P.3d 337, 342 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
82. 25 P. 1072, 1074 (Wash. 1891).
83. See Scott DeVito & Andrew W. Jurs, “Doubling-Down” for Defendants: The Pernicious Ef-
fects of Tort Reform, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 543, 545–48 (2014) (positing there are two causes of
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damages because it has avoided the brunt of the national tort re-
form movement, and is unburdened by outdated and ineffective
punitive damage statutes that must be repealed since the state has
never had a comprehensive punitive damage statute. For these rea-
sons, it is important to understand the current state of punitive
damages in Washington.
1. No Punitive Damages Unless a Statute Green Lights Them, If
They Are Brought Under General Maritime Law, or
Under the Laws of Another State
There are currently a few specific ways to get punitive damages in
Washington. The most common way is if punitive damages are spe-
cifically codified by legislation. Some codified punitive damage
awards include violations of the Insurance Fair Conduct Act,84 ac-
tion by governmental entities,85 and trespass to trees, shrubs, and
timber.86 These exceptions to the punitive damages rule in Wash-
ington are narrow, have their issues,87 and their critics.88
General maritime law claims are another exception that allows
punitive damage awards in Washington. The reason is that mari-
time actions brought in Washington state courts are governed by
federal maritime law, which recognizes general maritime law.
Under general maritime law, “an employer [that acts] callously or
willfully in withholding maintenance and cure [is] a basis for recov-
ering attorney fees and punitive damages.”89 Unfortunately, this
narrow exception leaves the land bound population of Washington
without access to punitive damages.
A third exception are cases that involve a choice of law between
Washington and another state, where the other state allows punitive
damages and has greater contacts to the case that lead to greater
public policy and governmental concerns than Washington. In
reduction in medical malpractice torts: (1) tort reform laws, and (2) background non-statu-
tory drop in medical malpractice tort filings, and they result in too large of a drop in tort
filings).
84. Insurance Fair Conduct Act, WASH. REV. CODE §48.3.015(2) (2007) (“[i]ncrease the
total award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damage”).
85. Consumer Protection Act, WASH. REV. CODE §19.86.090 (2009) (allowing treble dam-
ages for successful plaintiffs).
86. Injury to Trees Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 64.12.030 (2009).
87. Capping damages, like the Insurance Fair Conduct does (at three times the dam-
age), reduces the punitive damage’s effectiveness.
88. Joe Hampton, Let’s Hope Oregon Doesn’t Replicate Washington’s IFCA Mistake, INSURANCE
COMMANDO BLOG (Apr. 7, 2015, 11:26 PM), http://www.bpmlaw.com/lets-hope-oregon-
doesnt-replicate-washingtons-ifca-mistake/.
89. Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 272 P.3d 827, 831 (Wash. 2012).
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these circumstances, Washington can elect to award punitive dam-
ages under that state’s laws.90 Even with these available avenues for
punitive damages in Washington, they are rarely used.91 Punitive
damages are unavailable in Washington, unless you are lucky
enough to be injured in a peculiar set of circumstances listed in this
section. Washington courts do not allow punitive damages if you or
a family member gets hit by someone who intentionally drank too
much before intentionally getting into his car and driving;92 if you
were hit or almost hit by a safe that was being lifted into a room five
stories above you;93 if you are severely injured by an intentionally
poorly made product; and an endless list of other tortious acts that
should be deterred.
2. The Common Law on Punitive Damages in Washington:
A Pound of Flesh Does Not Help the Public
Since 1891, Washington courts have explicitly held that in civil
cases once a plaintiff is compensated for all of their resulting inju-
ries by a tortfeasor—including mental, emotional, and loss of
reputation—punitive damages cannot be allowed on the “theory
that it is for the benefit of society at large.”94 The seminal case, Spo-
kane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, revolved around the reckless
hoisting by the defendant of a heavy safe five stories above a com-
monly used building entrance, which  inevitably fell to the ground
and broke the plaintiff’s arm as she was leaving the building, com-
pletely unaware of the danger looming over her.95 The court in
Hoefer noted that criminal jurisdiction, and not civil jurisdiction, is
the sole means of punishing defendants in Washington courts, and
that a plaintiff in a civil case asking for punitive damages cannot
benefit the state, since the state recouped its damages by making
the tortfeasor compensate the victim.96 This precedent is in full
force today. A century after Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, the
Washington Supreme Court held: “[s]ince 1891, in an unbroken
90. See Singh v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 210 P.3d 337, 342 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
91. See generally Rustad, supra note 27 (using empirical research to show punitive damage
cases are rare).
92. Chris Davis, Should Washington State Allow Punitive Damages for Outrageous Conduct?,
DAVIS L. GROUP BLOG (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.injurytriallawyer.com/blog/should-wash-
ington-state-allow-punitive-damages-for-misconduct.cfm#comments.
93. See Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1074 (Wash. 1891).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1072.
96. Id. at 1073–74.
234 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:1
line of cases, it has been the law of this state that punitive damages
are not allowed unless expressly authorized by the legislature.”97
3. Washington’s Constitution: The Right to a Jury Trial Does Not
Include Punitive Damages
The Washington Supreme Court in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp. held
that, under Washington Constitution Article 1, § 21, the right of
trial by a jury did not include allowing juries to award punitive dam-
ages.98 The Court decided that the right to a jury trial did not
include punitive damages because the seminal case, Spokane Truck
& Dray Co. v. Hoefer, failed to find that Const. Article 1, § 21 allowed
punitive damage awards. The Court additionally noted that, since
three of the judges for the Spokane Truck & Dray Co. case served as
drafters for the Washington Constitutional Convention two years
prior, they likely knew that the drafters did not envision punitive
damage awards in the right to a jury trial.99 The constitutionality of
the right to a jury trial excluding punitive damages has not been
litigated in Washington since.
Part I set the foundation for understanding the purpose of puni-
tive damages. It also laid out the current state of punitive damages
in the Supreme Court and in Washington State. Part II examines
the benefits effective deterrence can offer Washington, and out-
lines the important contours that any punitive damage framework
needs to be successful. This examination of the benefits of deter-
rence for the public good forms the basis of the reform in Part III.
97. Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 635 P.2d 441, 445 (Wash. 1981) (citing Maki v. Alu-
minum Bldg. Products, 436 P.2d 186 (Wash. 1968); Spokane Truck & Dray Co., 25 P. at 1074.
98. 771 P.2d 711, 727 (Wash. 1989). While this seminal case written by Justice Utter
overruled a statutory limit on recoverable non-economic damages for wrongful death suits, it
did not extend the right of trial by jury to include punitive damages.
99. Id.; see Shoemaker v. Pang, No. 47242-9-I, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 362, at *18 (Wash.
Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2001) (stating plaintiff’s argument that “the state constitutional right to a
jury trial guarantees the right to allow juries to determine punitive damages . . . is
unpersuasive.”).
FALL 2016] Take a Stand Against Holmes’s Bad Man 235
II. A DEPICTION OF A SUCCESSFUL PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD
IN WASHINGTON
The tort reform movement’s focus on restraining lawsuits, and in
particular punitive damages,100 has not led to less arbitrary deci-
sions, but more. Similarly, while the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on punitive damages must be given credit for not
“draw[ing] a mathematical bright line between constitutionally ac-
ceptable and constitutionally unacceptable [punitive damage
awards],”101 their guidelines are unlikely to do much help, and po-
tentially make punitive damage awards less effective and more
arbitrary since Court’s caps on punitive damages are centered on
what the intentional tortfeasor could expect, versus adequate and
appropriate deterrence.102 The Court has it backwards.
Despite these problems, Washington can legislate an effective pu-
nitive damages scheme by addressing the myths of punitive
damages and utilizing law and economics, which would allow puni-
tive damages to deter potential tortfeasors and punish actual
tortfeasors. But before a possible law can be recommended, it is
crucial to address the main concerns about punitive damages, why
those concerns are mistaken, and what a punitive damages frame-
work should focus on.
A. Punitive Damages Serve the Public Good
The Washington Supreme Court in 1891 held that, in regards to
punitive damages, “the public surely has no interest in exacting the
pound of flesh.”103 But when confronted with intentionally harmful
or reckless conduct, most legal scholars disagree.104 In fact, the only
way to ensure that the public is not taken advantage of by
tortfeasors who can escape detection often is through punitive
damages.105
When looking at the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in
Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, it is tough to see why punitive
damages were banned in the first place: the grossly negligent mov-
ing of a safe over unaware people which falls from above and breaks
100.  Punitive Damages Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/issues/puni-
tive-damages-reform (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
101. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
102. Calandrillo, supra note 9, at 774.
103. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1074 (Wash. 1891).
104. See Calandrillo, supra note 9, at 774; see also POSNER, supra note 22, at 242.
105. POSNER, supra note 22, at 242.  (“If a tort is concealed, punitive damages must be
added to the defendant’s profit or the victim’s loss to provide adequate deterrence.”).
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someone’s arm appears ripe for collecting punishment under de-
terrence purposes.106 Perhaps the court was concerned that
awarding the plaintiff with a punitive damages award would stifle
business and hurt the entire state. But allowing a tortfeasor to in-
tentionally or recklessly cause harm to the public calls for greater
concern than punishing a reckless defendant and deterring similar
future conduct. Intentional tortfeasors already get away with inten-
tional crime more than they are caught in general—and this is why
punitive damages are necessary.107
1. Make Intentional Tortfeasors Think Twice
Before Committing a Tort
Punitive damages are meant to help the public through deter-
rence. Despite this, punitive damages are frequently believed to
harm the public through chilling innovation and encouraging po-
tential victims to act more recklessly in hopes of a delightful
punitive damage award.108 Tort reform proponents argue that per-
sonal injury suits clog our judicial system, pressure medical
professionals to conceal innocent mistakes, and line the pockets of
plaintiff personal injury attorneys.109 Research supporting these po-
sitions is steeped in rhetoric, but low on evidence.110 Conversely,
106. 25 P. at 1072.
107. POSNER, supra note 22, at 242.
108. See STELLA AWARDS, www.stellaawards.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2016) (mocking the
parties to the famous “hot coffee case,” Liebeck v. McDonald’s, as “opportunists and self-de-
scribed victims” versus “any available deep pockets and the U.S. Justice System”); see also
Lauren Pearle, “I’m Being Sued for WHAT?”, ABC NEWS: LAW AND JUSTICE UNIT (May 2, 2007),
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3121086&page=1 (“Seemingly frivolous lawsuits
are costing us billions and changing the way Americans live and function in society, experts
tell the ABC News Law & Justice Unit.”).
109. 2000 Republican Party Platform, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 31, 2000),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25849 (last visited Feb. 7, 2016).
110. Scott DeVito & Andrew Jurs, An Overreaction to a Nonexistent Problem: Empirical Analysis
of Tort Reform from the 1980s to 2000s, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 62, 62 (2015) (“Proponents of
tort reform have suggested it is a necessary response to rising personal injury litigation and
skyrocketing insurance premiums. Yet the research into the issue has mixed results, and the
necessity of tort reform has remained unproven.”); see Punitive Damages Reform, AM. TORT
REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/issues/punitive-damages-reform (last visited Sept. 25,
2016) (“The difficulty of predicting whether punitive damages will be awarded by a jury in
any particular case, and the marked trend toward astronomically large amounts when they
are awarded, have seriously distorted settlement and litigation processes and have led to
wildly inconsistent outcomes in similar cases.”). see also Marshall Allen, Doctor Confesses: I Lied
To Protect Colleague in Malpractice Suit, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 23, 2016 5:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/09/23/494920109/doctor-confesses-i-lied-
to-protect-colleague-in-malpractice-suit?sc=tw (former doctor discusses committing perjury to
protect a colleague who committed medical malpractice, and the pressure doctors face to
protect each other from medical malpractice suits).
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research on punitive damages has shown that punitive damage
awards are typically not blockbuster hits,111 and sought in only ten
percent of all tort lawsuits that go to trial.112
The real question regarding punitive damages and deterrence is
whether punitive damages effectively deter potential tortfeasors
from intentional torts. This is a tough question to answer, especially
looking at the struggle of our criminal justice system’s attempt to
justify heavy prison sentences and deterrence with little success.113
While examples from the criminal justice system are helpful to eval-
uate what does and does not deter individuals, it operates with far
different circumstances and consequences than most civil punitive
damages cases. The price to deter someone from committing an
intentional crime is generally far higher than that person can pay,
and insolvency problems stop punitive damages in their tracks.114
But this is typically not the case in most civil suits where punitive
damages are brought since the intentional tortfeasor is often
wealthy;115 this means punitive damages can be a great source of
deterrence for intentional torts.116 This explains why some punitive
damages do not make intentional wrongdoers think twice in the
criminal sphere, but work well on the civil side. Allowing punitive
damages benefits the public twofold: (1) it helps ensure the plain-
tiff is fully compensated for the harm done,117 and (2) encourages
that tortfeasor and similarly situated individuals to act in line with
the law and cause less harm.
Drawing on a few symbolic punitive damages award decisions, it
appears that punitive damages are effective at making potential
tortfeasors take their intentionally tortious conduct into account.
111. See Punitive Damages in Civil Trials, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS (June 7, 2011), http:/
/www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=45111 (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
112. Id. (“The median punitive damage award was $64,000, and 13% of cases with puni-
tive awards had damages of $1 million or more.”).
113. See POSNER, supra note 22, at 287 (explaining why economic arguments for the War
on Drugs heavy prison sentences are unimpressive).
114. Id. at 256.
115. See supra Part I (discussing well known punitive damages cases against wealthy com-
panies); see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 35, at 910 (discussing how jury instructions are
often realistically tailored to fit the tortfeasors’ wealth).
116. See POSNER, supra note 22, at 260 (“[E]conomists like fines as a mode of punishment
because they are much cheaper than prison, since the fine is revenue to the government and
once it’s been collected the government has no further expense of punishment of the person
fined; that is very different from having to pay the living costs of a prison inmate.”).
117. See id. at 234 (explaining how tort law often fails to restore a party back to its pre-
injury utility and is an inefficient method of compensation).
238 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:1
For example, McDonald’s, after the often-mocked Liebeck v. McDon-
ald’s Restaurants,118 put warnings on their lids and cups alerting
customers that the coffee is very hot.119 In Liebeck, the plaintiff was
originally awarded $160,000 in compensatory damages and two
days’ worth of McDonald’s profit from its coffee sales for punitive
damages, which amounted to $2.7 million.120 However, this award
was reduced to three times the compensatory award, $480,000, for a
total of $640,000.121 The parties entered into a settlement for an
undisclosed amount in order to avoid more appeals.122 Similarly, in
Mathias,123 Motel 6 stopped renting out rooms infested with bed
bugs to unsuspecting customers after receiving a compensatory
judgment of $5,000 and a punitive damage award of $186,000—
$1,000 awarded for each room in the infested motel.124 Opponents
of punitive damages maintain that the tortfeasors in these cases
would have been deterred and adequately punished by compensa-
tory damages, but this is hard to believe, especially when big
business and other intentional tortfeasors continue to commit in-
tentional torts.125
2. Punish Intentional Tortfeasors for Being Intentionally Bad
What are we supposed to do when we finally catch an intentional
tortfeasor red-handed? Treat them the same as an accidental, non-
reckless tortfeasor? Let Ken, from our example in Part I, keep slap-
ping Stan? If the purpose of tort law is only to compensate
individuals for harm wrongly done to them, then yes, we should
treat these individuals the same. While a main focus of tort law is
compensation, it is not the only focus—which is fortunate because
118. Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. 93-CV-02419, 1995 WL 360309
(N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994), vacated sub nom. Liebeck v. Restaurants, (N.M. Dist. Nov. 28,
1994).
119. Kevin G. Cain, And Now, the Rest of the Story . . . About the Mcdonald’s Coffee Lawsuit,
HOUSTON LAWYER 25, 30 (July/Aug. 2007) (questioning whether the reduced verdict had




123. 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2004).
124. Id. at 678 (reasoning that the punitive award was likely given by multiplying $1,000
times the number of rooms in the motel).
125. See Rustad, supra note 27, at 15 (“If potential wrongdoers know that their total expo-
sure is limited to a fixed amount, there is only a limited deterrent effect. Removing wealth
from the punitive damages equation also eliminates effective punishment.”); see also Mathias
v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2004).
FALL 2016] Take a Stand Against Holmes’s Bad Man 239
tort law has shortcomings in compensating injured individuals.126
Unlike Holmes’s Bad Man doctrine, where a contracting party has
the right to either perform or pay to breach, tort doctrine strives to
make people behave reasonably and take care not to injure
others.127 If tort law did not care about deterrence, then Holmes’s
Bad Man would rule, Ken would continue slapping Stan, and inten-
tional torts would be more profitable than they already are.
Because tort law cannot guarantee full compensation, it uses its
other goal of deterrence to make up for its compensation down-
falls.128 Punishing these individuals the same would give a subsidy to
intentional tortfeasors for their civil wrongs. This is a bad incentive
for public welfare. Punitive damage awards tax away the gained
profit that intentional tortfeasors obtain,129 which are untouched by
compensatory damages.
3. Restricting Punitive Damages Means Punitive Damage Worthy
Conduct is More Likely to Occur and be More
Profitable
It is important to think about the flip side of this debate—what
does not allowing or severely limiting punitive damages do for a
state? The more restricted punitive damages are, the less likely a
tortfeasor will have to account for their intentional conduct, which
means more negative externalities are pushed onto a state’s citi-
zens. This is because attorneys, and society, are forced to not take
into consideration the cost that the intentional tortfeasor imposes
on society through past, undetected torts, and the intentional
tortfeasor gets an unearned benefit from its intentional and con-
cealed acts. This makes intentional torts more profitable, especially
in the context of big business. It is not reassuring to hear punitive
damages opponents say the market will punish these intentional
126. POSNER, supra note 22, at 234 (stating that the primary function of tort law is deter-
rence, since it is a costly and incomplete form of compensation).
127. Jill Wieber Lens, Justice Holmes’s Bad Man and the Depleted Purposes of Punitive Damages,
101 KY. L.J. 789, 789 (2013) (“The bad man is not affected by morality and sees a tort duty
only as an obligation to pay damages.”).
128. POSNER, supra note 22, at 234 (“[Tort law’s] primary economic function . . . given the
existence of accident and liability insurance, is not compensation; it is the deterrence of
inefficient accidents.”); see also id. n.112. Further, most—if not all—victims would rather have
never been injured versus receiving a monetary sum in an attempt to restore them to their
pre-injury state.
129. Id. at 242.
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tortfeasors—especially when considering the massive transaction
cost differences between large corporations and their consumers.130
Barring punitive damages favors both big businesses that are not
phased by compensatory damages,131 and potentially consumers
who do not have to pay higher costs stemming from the result of
punitive damages awarded against a business. The first case does
not favor the public. Rather, it does quite the opposite: the busi-
ness’s interests are put above those of the consumer. The second
case, if true, could provide support for banning punitive damages.
But, even if true, it is tough to argue it is acceptable for businesses
to assume that citizens agree with paying less in cash for the good
or service and paying more with the risk of serious injury. Refusing
or restraining punitive damages severely means that behavior war-
ranting punitive damages will be subsidized by that jurisdiction’s
constituents, whether or not they support the tortfeasor’s actions.
B. The Amount of Punitive Damages Must be High to Disincentivize
Intentionally Bad Acts
Intentional torts are deserving of more punishment than unin-
tentional torts for another important reason—these tortfeasors are
better able to evade detection because they planned out their inten-
tional wrongdoing.132 A good example of this is Mathias, where the
tortfeasor intentionally evaded detection, albeit temporarily, by tell-
ing customers that the rooms were not filled with bedbugs, but
ticks.133 Banning or restricting punitive damages in this case means
that Motel 6, the tortfeasor, would have not been punished for all
of the previous times it lied to its customers and subjected them to
130. Id. at 491. Often the market is unable to effectively regulate intentional wrongs be-
cause the intentional tortfeasor has substantially more bargaining power than the consumer.
Examples of this phenomenon include small but widespread harms, detection issues, and
other transaction problems.
131. See Cain, supra note 119, at 25–26 (“Evidence at [Liebeck’s] trial was simply damn-
ing. It was learned that McDonald’s was aware of more than 700 claims brought against it
between 1982 and 1992 due to people being burned by its coffee.”); REUTERS, CEO Martin
Shkreli Says Securities Fraud Charges Are “Baseless,” 21 WESTLAW J. HEALTHCARE FRAUD 9 (2016)
(highlighting former drug company’s indifference towards the consequences of raising the
price of lifesaving AIDS medication).
132. POSNER, supra note 22, at 256 (“Being for the most part a by-product of lawful, public
activities, accidents usually are difficult to conceal and breaches of contract usually impossi-
ble to conceal. But someone who is deliberately endeavoring to take something of value from
someone else will naturally try to conceal what he is doing, and will often succeed because he
has planned the concealment in advance.”).
133. Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2004).
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bedbug infiltrated rooms. This, as stated previously above, gives in-
tentional tortfeasors an undeserved subsidy. If the cost of halting
the “chilling effect of punitive damages”134 comes at the price of
letting intentional tortfeasors have a competitive advantage—in
that individuals and corporations are incentivized to invest in re-
sisting detection rather than consumer safety—this tradeoff
preference cannot be attributed to the general public. Additionally,
it is inefficient from an economics standpoint.135 Yet there are
scholars and attorneys who state that punitive damages do not have
any effect because, while punitive damages do enter into corporate
decision-makers’ calculations, their effect is diluted because puni-
tive damages are rarely given.136
Even if punitive damages are diluted because they are only
awarded in a handful of cases, that appears to be more of a reason
to award punitive damages than hold them back. This is even more
true when looking at the procedural mechanisms already in place
today to prevent frivolous lawsuits from proceeding on the merits—
not the least of which is the heightened pleading standard resulting
from Twombly and Iqbal137—alongside the inherent costs in bringing
a worthless personal injury suit to the plaintiff and to the plaintiff’s
attorney. The more likely an intentional tortfeasor is to escape de-
tection, the higher punitive damages should be in order to obtain
optimal deterrence.138
Part II showed the most important goals of an effective punitive
damage framework for Washington. Part III specifically applies
those goals into a coherent statutory scheme to obtain the maxi-
mum amount of deterrence while still abiding by the Supreme
Court’s precedent. Part III’s easy to apply framework supports the
argument that punitive damages should be revamped in each state,
and that this reform is the most effective way to do so.
134. The Chilling Effect of Punitive Damages, CTR. FOR AM., http://
www.legalreforminthenews.com/speakers/punitives/punitives_2.html (last visited Sept. 25,
2016).
135. Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 551
(1969) (explaining the inefficiencies of monopolies); see supra Part II.A.3. (discussing the
problems of letting intentional tortfeasors have an unearned subsidy at the cost of public
safety).
136. Steven B. Hantler, The Seven Myths of Highly Effective Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 42 CIV. JUST. F.
2, 3 (2004) (“When firms look forward, the prospect of punitive damages is so uncertain that
there is no deterrent effect.”) (quoting Kip W. Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive
Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 381, 383 (1998)).
137. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 699 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
556 (2007).
138. POSNER, supra note 22, at 242.
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III. A PROPOSED PUNITIVE DAMAGE REGULATORY SCHEME CUSTOM-
FIT FOR WASHINGTON, AND A MODEL FOR THE
ENTIRE NATION
In Washington, it pays to plan your intentional tort. Intentional
tortfeasors get the benefit of an increased chance of evading detec-
tion, and if they are caught, they are only held liable—if
successfully sued—for the damage they caused to the specific indi-
vidual. The result is that those who commit intentional torts will not
be adequately deterred and have no legal or economic incentive to
change their behavior.139 This is a less than ideal situation for Wash-
ington, especially as its population continues to grow.140 The
following punitive damage scheme can reduce intentional torts in
Washington, as well as provide a punitive damages template for
other states to follow.141
A. Sifting Out Arbitrary Decisions
Any potential punitive damage scheme in Washington needs to
center on deterring intentional torts and fall in line with the Four-
teenth Amendment due process doctrine on punitive damages. The
doctrine is best defined by the Supreme Court’s decision in State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell: “few awards exceeding a single-
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a signif-
icant degree, will satisfy due process.”142 While the State Farm
opinion arguably gets in the way of optimal deterrence with its sin-
gle-digit ratio suggestion for punitive damages, the decision is
porous enough to allow near optimal deterrence with careful
guidance.143
Washington can create its punitive damages framework to obtain
near optimal deterrence and stay within the constitutional lines
139. Id. (arguing punitive damages are necessary to make the tortfeasor “indifferent be-
tween stealing and buying my neighbor’s car”).
140. OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., STATE OF WASHINGTON: FORECAST OF THE STATE POPULATION,
(November 2015), http://www.ofm.wa.gov/pop/stfc/stfc2015/stfc_2015.pdf.
141. The idea of states creating innovative, effective, and influential solutions to
problems is one of the most beneficial aspects of our democracy, and is well supported in
constitutional precedent. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (J., Bran-
deis dissent) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
142. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
143. POSNER, supra note 22, at 243 (explaining that, while punitive damages should be
based on the individual’s acts, and not who the individual is, the suggested Supreme Court
limit may only apply “when the compensatory damages are very large”).
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drawn in State Farm by delineating the categories of torts that are
eligible for punitive damages and specifying the ratio-range of puni-
tive damages available. This certainly does not add up to optimal
deterrence, but it is closer than implementing punitive damage ac-
tions with an across-the-board ban on punitive damages or a strict
cap based solely on the ratio between compensatory and punitive
damages.144 Additionally, giving clear guidance to Washington’s pu-
nitive damage scheme will allow it to be more transferable to other
states looking to decrease harm done by intentional tortfeasors.
1. Mens Rea Inquiry
The first inquiry looks to the tortfeasor’s mens rea—negligent,
reckless, intentional, or malicious—to decide what prima facie ra-
tio-range of damages is appropriate. The purpose of sorting what
type of punitive damage awards are available through a gradation of
culpability standards is to satisfy the State Farm guideline that a sin-
gle-digit ratio of compensatory to punitive damages should be the
general ratio awarded, and to combat the perceived and real dan-
ger of getting hit with arbitrary damages.145
This framework accounts for Justice Souter’s concern that “even
Holmes’ bad man” can reasonably determine the amount of dam-
ages, including potential punitive damages, for which he may be
liable.146 Unfortunately, Justice Souter’s concern on predicting
one’s punitive damage liability, if incorporated into law, would
hamper the effectiveness of punitive damages. Such a system would
allow a hypothetical tortfeasor to weigh the cost and likelihood of
being successfully sued by simply adding a single digit ratio for pu-
nitive damages combined with the likelihood of being caught,
versus the benefits to them of committing the tort. There is some-
thing to be said for predictability, but it is not clear that this factor
should take a front seat in determining damages meant solely to
deter similar future behavior. Putting limits on the amount of puni-
tive damage that can be awarded prevents them from being
optimally effective, since, as the Court noted in Exxon Valdez, the
bad man can “look ahead” and plan.147 As Professor Lens explains,
144. Id.
145. Id. (warning that “[e]xcessive punishment can overdeter; a defendant should have
reasonable notice of the sanction for unlawful acts so that he can make a rational determina-
tion of how to act; and sanctions should be based on the wrong done rather than on the
status of the defendant”).
146. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 502 (2008).
147. Id.
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The reason that the bad man may be affected by punitive dam-
ages is not that he suddenly appreciates the immorality of his
conduct. Instead, the unpredictable damages may reach him be-
cause they preclude him from accurately planning out the
damages of his tortious conduct, perhaps dissuading him from
committing the conduct in the first place. The Supreme
Court’s insistence on predictability in Exxon Shipping Co. pre-
cludes the use of this strategy of reaching the bad man.148
The focus should not be on whether Holmes’ bad man is shocked
by a damages award, but if the damages award will deter him.
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on predictability undercuts the
deterrence and punishment goals of punitive damages. A better pu-
nitive damages doctrine is based in law and economics, and revolves
around the probability of detection rates; meaning punitive dam-
age awards “should be set by multiplying the inverse of the
probability of detection by the amount of actual harm in the instant
case.”149 Nevertheless, while we cannot ignore the Supreme Court’s
decisions on punitive damages, we can incorporate them to achieve
as much deterrence as possible given the Supreme Court’s sug-
gested boundaries.
In this Note’s proposed scheme, torts involving negligent acts are
not eligible for punitive damages because they do not involve an
individual trying to take advantage of another, and damages to
make the plaintiff whole are enough to cause the typical negligent
tortfeasor to mind their behavior. Negligent torts often have a high
rate of detection, and, as a result, punitive damages are not war-
ranted because they are relatively easy to assign liability and a
proper remedy.150 It would certainly seem unfair to award punitive
damages when all a tortfeasor did was fail to live up to the reasona-
ble person standard on a specific occasion.
Reckless tortfeasors will be eligible for punitive damages capped
at a 1:1 compensatory to punitive damage ratio, with the top end
reserved for extremely dangerous acts.151 For example, a plaintiff
148. Lens, supra note 127, at 814–15 (emphasis added).
149. Calandrillo, supra note 9, at 821; see also Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick Fitzgerald,
Punitive Damages and the Supreme Court’s Reasonable Relationship Test: Ignoring the Economics of
Deterrence, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 237, 249 (2005) (arguing the Supreme Court
should base its punitive damages doctrine on rational economic principles).
150. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 35, at 874 (explaining that, for high detection torts,
“punitive damages would not be appropriate because the firm is unlikely to escape detection
and liability for this harm”).
151. See Mary P. Kehoe, Lost in Translation: The Circuitous Route to A Standard for Punitive
Damages, 35 VT. B.J. 22, 27 (2009) (arguing Vermont’s strict recklessness without “bad mo-
tive” is too strict of a standard for deciding whether punitive damages are appropriate); see
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sues a reckless tortfeasor for drinking ten beers and then driving his
SUV, only to come crashing into the plaintiff’s sedan, seriously in-
juring the plaintiff.152 Reckless tortfeasors also have a high
detection rate, because their acts are not planned out.153 Since reck-
less tortfeasors have high detection rates, there is less of a need to
levy large punitive damage awards against them.
Intentional tortfeasors will be subject to punitive damages in any
amount, so long as the amount is directly tied to their related tor-
tious conduct. This is because the intentional tortfeasor planned
their acts knowing the harm they would cause others, and they have
a lower detection rate than non-intentional torts.154 A great exam-
ple of an intentional tortfeasor who would be liable for punitive
damages in this scheme is GM in their ignition-switch fiasco. In-
stead of informing their consumers of a defective ignition switch
design that killed dozens, GM chose to cover up their deadly igni-
tion switches.155 This costs and benefits “business decision,” cost 124
people their lives as of December 10, 2015.156 A court can deter-
mine if conduct is directly tied to the defendant’s conduct by
looking at the detection rate of the tort,157 the profit expected by
the tortfeasor from the act,158 and seeing if the punitive award is
reasonably within those parameters. These safeguards will help pre-
vent any arbitrary punitive damage judgments, and help support a
judgment that falls above or below a single digit compensatory to
punitive damages ratio.
Malicious tortfeasors are less deterrable than reckless or inten-
tional tortfeasors, so a larger award is warranted. A malicious
tortfeasor is someone who intends to get profit and satisfaction
also Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 493 (capping punitive damage limit at 1:1 ratio because
act was not intentional, but only reckless).
152. See Chris Davis, Should Washington State Allow Punitive Damages for Outrageous Conduct?,
DAVIS L. GROUP BLOG (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.injurytriallawyer.com/blog/should-wash
ington-state-allow-punitive-damages-for-misconduct.cfm (“If our legislature rejects more jail
time for drunk drivers, than why not allow an innocent victim or the victim’s family to re-
cover punitive damages instead? A drunk driver who kills should at least be subject to
financial punishment . . . . It only seems fair.”).
153. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
154. POSNER, supra note 22, at 242 (stating that to deter a tortfeasor with a low detection
rate, more than compensatory damages is necessary).
155. Nathan Bomey & Kevin McCoy, GM Agrees to $900M Criminal Settlement Over Ignition-
Switch Defect, USA TODAY (Sept. 17, 2015, 6:37 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
cars/2015/09/17/gm-justice-department-ignition-switch-defect-settlement/32545959/.
156. Chris Isidore, Death Toll for GM Ignition Switch: 124, CNN: MONEY (Dec. 10, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/10/news/companies/gm-recall-ignition-switch-death-toll/.
157. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 21, 21–22 (1991). Note that, the lower the
detection rate, the more support there is for a higher punitive damage award.
158. Id.
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from harming someone. This tortfeasor will not be deterred by sim-
ple compensation plus profit disgorgement. For this reason,
malicious tortfeasors will be subject to any amount that is reasonably
related to the tortfeasor’s action, and deemed adequate to deter
them from similar future behavior. Reasonably related is different
from the “directly tied to” limit proposed for intentional tortfeasors
because it is based on pure deterrence. Malicious tortfeasors will
not get the benefit of a reviewing court’s inquiry into whether the
judgment is based on the detection rate and profit expected by the
tortfeasor’s act, because the jury and any reviewing court will be
looking to see if the punitive damage award is in line with the main
function of punitive damages—deterrence. The wider leeway for
this classification of tortfeasors falls in line with Justice Souter’s State
Farm single digit preference, since these tortfeasors will likely fit in
the “rare occasion” category where punitive damage judgments are
not tethered to a 1:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages.
2. Clear and Convincing Requirement
The second and most important inquiry is whether or not the
plaintiff meets their burden of proof for proving if a punitive dam-
ages award is warranted. Some states choose to use simple
preponderance of the evidence, but Washington would do well to
follow the lead of other states that use the standard of “clear and
convincing evidence.”159 Clear and convincing evidence is some-
where between preponderance of the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt.160 This provides another filter to make sure that
on the rare occasion that punitive damages are awarded, they are
awarded against people who deserve them. Ensuring that tortfeasors
are not saddled with a punitive damage award based on an emo-
tional whim should shield the jury’s determination from being
overturned by upset reckless, intentional, or malicious tortfeasors
appealing their case, as well as from the lobbying efforts of tort re-
form advocates. Table 1 below summarizes this reform, and
highlights its simplicity.
159. 58 A.L.R. 4th 878 (Originally published in 1987) (listing the several states with “clear
and convincing” as the appropriate standard).
160. Id.
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TABLE 1. A GRADUATED CULPABILITY PUNITIVE DAMAGES
FRAMEWORK
CULPABILITY LEVEL PUNITIVE 1:1 AMOUNT AMOUNT REASONABLY






B. Where Should the Punitive Damages Go?
Since a plaintiff is theoretically “made whole” without punitive
damages, it may seem that the plaintiff should not get any of the
punitive damage award. However, plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys
will have no incentive to bring punitive damages against appropri-
ate tortfeasors if they are only burdened by the process and do not
receive any benefit from attaching a punitive damages claim to
their suit—i.e., have to prove more, spend more, and take more
time trying the case, only to lose all of that effort regardless of the
outcome. It is hard to imagine any attorney spending money that
will not help their client or increase the success of their practice.
A potential compromise for those that believe a large punitive
damage award is simply too much of a windfall would be to split the
punitive damage award between the plaintiff and the state, or chari-
ties of the plaintiff’s choosing. Some states already have “split-
recovery statutes,” giving up to seventy-five percent of the punitive
damage award directly back to the state.161 The actual percentage of
the split is not so important, as long as it provides enough incentive
for plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring legitimate punitive
damage claims, instead of letting them go by the wayside and al-
lowing tortfeasors to continue to get a great deal on their
intentional tort in Washington. If a compromise on punitive dam-
age award allocation is necessary, a way to ensure enough incentive
is maintained for plaintiffs and their attorneys would be to make
sure that any extra cost plaintiffs incur to meet their punitive dam-
ages burden of proof is covered by the award, as well as adding a
161. Brian H. Bornstein & Sarah Thimsen, Should Society Get a Share of Punitive Damage
Awards?, 38 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 14 (2007) http://www.apa.org/moni-
tor/nov07/jn.aspx; but see Sharkey, supra note 12, at 404 (flagging argument that split-
recovery awards “in effect ‘bribe[s]’ [states] to overlook the compromise of procedural
protections”).
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more than nominal amount that serves the purpose of encouraging
meritorious punitive damage claims.
C. Punitive Damages through the Legislature
There are two routes for implementing a punitive damages
scheme in Washington: the courts or the legislature. Unfortunately,
the judicial route is unlikely to be a successful one because the
Washington Supreme Court has continued to uphold the Spokane
Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer ban on punitive damages.162 Therefore, it
is doubtful a plaintiff in Washington would spend any time funnel-
ing resources toward attempting to overturn this 125 year-old
precedent—or that a Washington court would overturn the long-
standing precedent. Fortunately, the legislature is not bound by
stare decisis and can pass a law implementing the above punitive
damage scheme if citizens of Washington are supportive of deter-
ring intentional tortfeasors. Washington’s favorable use of the
minor punitive damages scheme in its Insurance Fair Conduct
Act163 suggests it is plausible the citizens of Washington would not
be opposed to enacting a statute allowing punitive damages for civil
actions. This Note’s proposed statutory framework would pass both
Washington and the United States’ constitutional requirements and
deliver more deterrence than current punitive damages legislation,
which is precisely why this proposal for Washington should be the
model for the rest of the nation.
Part III put forth a comprehensive and simple reform for ensur-
ing that punitive damages actually deter wrongdoing. This Note
concludes by arguing that punitive damage reform is not simply a
Washington State concern, but a national concern.
CONCLUSION: PEOPLE NEED PROTECTION—NOT BIG BUSINESS AND
INTENTIONAL TORTFEASORS
Washington should prevent intentional tortfeasors from benefit-
ting off its intentional tort friendly climate. Using a two-step
method to deter intentional tortfeasors in accordance with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause ensures that punitive
162. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1074 (Wash. 1891).
163. Isaac Ruiz, All About Washington’s Insurance Fair Conduct Act (IFCA), Part 2: IFCA, A
New Hope, ISAAC RUIZ BLOG (June 25, 2013), http://100percentisaac.com/blog/2013/9/1/
all-about-the-insurance-fair-conduct-act-ifca-ifca-a-new-hope; Ainsworth v. Progressive Cas.
Ins. Co., 322 P.3d 6, 21 (Wash. App. 2014) (affirming treble damages under IFCA).
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damage awards against intentional tortfeasors will not be unfair,
and will be more effective than Washington’s current environment
of no punitive damages, as well as other states’ punitive damage
schemes that are weighed down by tort reform legislation. This re-
form is not perfect, but it is realistic and better than any other
punitive damage framework in use.
Tort reform advocates have successfully shifted the public per-
spective on tort law from compensating and protecting wronged
individuals to making sure corporations are not hit too hard or too
often for the harm they cause. The implied assumption is that
tortfeasors, especially corporations, cannot live up to this high stan-
dard—be it reasonableness or otherwise—and the injured party is
simply out of luck. The sad reality is that the person injured by the
defendant’s actions has to pick up the tab for damages that exceed
the caps put in place by tort reform. Deterrence through punitive
damages can help put the burden back where it belongs: on the
intentional tortfeasor.
Punitive damages, properly used, serve the public good. Wash-
ington is in an important position to influence the rest of the
nation on what punitive damages are meant to do—deter inten-
tional tortfeasors from harming others. It would be a shame to pass
on this opportunity to inform big business and intentional
tortfeasors that taking advantage of another person for profit is not
acceptable in Washington—or the United States.
